to come, as the United States' own system of race relations is increasingly seen as approximating that of Brazil.4
The conversation began in the late 1800s with the arrival in Brazil of the North Atlantic doctrines of scientific racism, Social Darwinism, and, in its most extreme form, white racial supremacy. The response of Brazilian elites and intellectuals to these imported ideas was ambivalent. On the one hand, racial theories arrived in Brazil imbued with the full prestige of European science, and they also accorded with native Brazilian notions of white racial superiority. On the other hand, scientific racism's vigorous condemnation of race mixture constituted a devastating criticism of Brazilian society -which as of 1890 was one-third mulatto, and majority non-white -and a bleak forecast of its future.
Some Brazilian thinkers -most notably ethnographer and medical doctor Raimundo Nina Rodrigues -accepted the dictates of scientific racism, including its assertions of 'mulatto degeneracy'. (This despite the fact that Rodrigues was himself a person of mixed race.) Others, however, sought to escape the damning implications of racist theory by, in effect, extending its explanatory power in the form of the 'whitening thesis'. Orthodox scientific racists asserted the superiority of white racial inheritance but also argued that that inheritance was weakened and undermined by mixture with 'inferior' races. 'Whitening thesis' revisionists such as Joao Batista de Lacerda, director of Brazil's National Museum, responded that the scientific racists had too little faith in the power of white genes (or, in the language of the time, white 'blood'). In cases of racial mixture, they argued, the white genetic component would tend to dominate; and if such mixture were repeated over several generations, the end result would be a 'whitened' population in which African and Indian ancestry was overcome and neutralized.5
The whitening thesis saved Brazil from the gloomy prospect of racial degeneration and held out the hope of its one day being able to join the community of white nations. It also formed a powerful incentive to Brazilian policy-makers to speed up the process of whitening, or branqueamento, by excluding nonwhites from Brazil's genetic pool and increasing the European component. The 1891 constitution prohibited African and Asian immigration into the country, and the federal and state governments of the First Republic (1891-1930) made concerted efforts to attract European immigration. These efforts bore fruit in the form of 2.5 million Europeans who migrated to Brazil between 1890 and 1914, 987,000 with their steamship passage paid for by state subsidies. After a lull during the first world war, another 847,000 Europeans arrived during the 1920s.6
Thanks to the immigrants, the national census of 1920 was able to confirm 'a tendency that is becoming more visible and defined: the tendency toward the progressive Aryanization of our regional groups. That is to say, the coefficient of the white race is becoming more and more elevated in our population.' Brazil's experience with whitening was conclusively disproving the scientific racists, one of whom (French anthropologist Vacher de Lapouge) had observed in 1890, the census noted, that 'one hundred years from now Brazil without a doubt will constitute an immense black state, unless, as is probable, it reverts to barbarism'. Viewing such predictions from the vantage point of 1920, 'we have the right, without a doubt, and without the slightest irreverence, to smile'.7
One suspects that the smile may have been a little forced. The confidence of the census's assertions was belied by the fact that the document contained no data whatsoever on the racial composition of the population, nor had any national census done so since 1890. Nevertheless, it was clear that whitening was having an impact on Brazilian society, introducing unanticipated tensions and conflicts. Native-born workers faced intense job competition from the immigrants, and objected strenuously to the open preference for Europeans displayed by many employers. Members of the Brazilian middle class, particularly skilled tradesmen and small retail merchants, faced similar competition from the immigrants and their children. And even employers and elites turned against the immigrants as the latter imported into Brazil the alien doctrines of anarchism and socialism and a new and more militant style of labour organization. The effort to transform Brazil into a white, European society in the tropics had failed. In so doing, it reopened the question of the path of Brazil's future development, and the racial character of its national identity. In 1933 an answer was provided by intellectual and social theorist Gilberto Freyre, who resumed the dialogue between Brazil and its North Atlantic interlocutors, but now on different terms. The proponents of whitening had sought to Europeanize Brazil and make it white; Freyre, by contrast, accepted that Brazil was neither white nor European, and would never be either. Rather than Europe in the tropics, Brazil was destined to be a 'new world in the tropics': a uniquely American experiment in which Europeans, Indians, and Africans had come together to create a genuinely multi-racial and multi-cultural society."
Freyre had been a student in the United States in the 191 Os and early 1920s, and had been horrified by the Jim Crow institutions and practices (including a lynching) which he witnessed while studying at Baylor University in Texas and travelling through the South.'2 Recoiling from the violence and brutality of Southern segregation, he sought refuge in a vision of Brazil as a 'racial democracy', 'one of the most harmonious unions of culture with nature and of one culture with another that the lands of this hemisphere have ever known'.'3 That union was both symbolized by and embodied in the racially mixed mulattoes, whom Freyre viewed not as a transitional stage on the road to national whiteness but rather as the most characteristically 'Brazilian' element of national society. He explicitly rejected the scientific racists' claims that 'the mulatto is incapable of achieving stability as the social and intellectual equal of the white man', responding that 'in the sense of corresponding more closely to the Brazilian milieu and of easier and possibly deeper adaptation to its interests, its tastes, its needs, the half-breed, the mulatto, or, to put it more delicately, the dark-complexioned person, would seem to show more capacity for leadership than the white or near white'. And as a result of that leadership, 'Brazil is becoming more and more a racial democracy, characterized by an almost unique combination of diversity and unity'.'4
The shock of Freyre's encounter with the racial hostility and The Afro-Brazilian press commented not only on the obvious shortcomings of racial democracy: the discrimination which nonwhites suffered in their pursuit of jobs, education, and other opportunities for upward mobility.2 It noted as well one of the ideology's less obvious internal contradictions: while asserting the equality of all races, racial democracy simultaneously expressed a clear preference for racially mixed mulattoes over people of completely African ancestry.22 Some writers in the black press accepted the racial superiority of mulattoes over pretos (blacks), but most rejected the notion of mulatto superiority and its division of the Afro-Brazilian population into antagonistic and competing groups.23 Intellectuals and activists such as Vicente Ferreira (a preto) and Jose Correia Leite (a mulatto) sought to overcome this division by promoting the use of the word negro to group together people of mixed and unmixed African ancestry.24 But their efforts had little effect, and in 1947 Correia Leite ruefully observed that 'in this nation of mestizos, it is only the blacks who have the courage' to denounce racism. As a result, 'we continue to be swallowed up by the sentimental lie that in Brazil there is no prejudice. But Brazil continues to be one enormous slave quarters, with a few blacks in the Big House. '25 Criticisms of racial democracy were thus well developed among Afro-Brazilian intellectuals and in the black press during the 1930s and 1940s. These critiques, however, took place well outside the boundaries of mainstream intellectual, academic, and official discourse, where Freyre's paradigm held unquestioned hegemony.26 Not until properly accredited 'establishment' writers and researchers started to question racial democracy would its hold on conceptions of national identity start to loosen. And that, in turn, did not happen until international events and influences started to press in on Brazil from outside its borders.
The first such event was a series of research projects on Brazilian race relations, carried out by Brazilian, United States, and French scholars during the early 1950s under the auspices of the newly created United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In response to the recent horrors of nazism and the Holocaust, UNESCO had adopted as part of its institutional mission the combating of racism throughout the world. Brazilian racial democracy seemed to offer a particularly promising alternative to such racism, and in an effort to understand how racial egalitarianism had come about in Brazil and how it functioned in practice, UNESCO's Division of Social Sciences commissioned research teams in the two principal cities of the industrialized south-east-Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo -and in several small towns in Minas Gerais and the northeastern states of Bahia and Pernambuco. As often happens with research, the results were not what had been anticipated. All of the teams found high levels of inequality between the white and non-white populations, and abundant evidence of racist attitudes and stereotypes. Researchers in the north-east tended to see these inequalities as expressive more of class differences than racial differences -that is, blacks suffered discrimination and were looked down upon not because they were black but because they were poor.27 Researchers in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, by contrast, placed more emphasis on race-based prejudice and discrimination, noting the differences in treatment accorded to working-class whites and blacks, and the extreme difficulties experienced by educated, qualified blacks and mulattoes striving to enter or move upward in the middle class.28
The second event coincided with the UNESCO projects. Despite the government's opposition to, and attempted suppression of, criticisms of racial democracy, the tide running against the ideology proved impossible to stem, in part because of the dictatorship's own policies of national economic development. One of the tasks involved in making Brazil a geopolitical power was to improve its system of higher education, to which the regime gave high priority. The result was a dramatic increase in the size and number of Brazilian universities during the 1970s. This in turn meant an influx of young teaching staff, a number of whom had received advanced degrees abroad. Gilberto Freyre's experiences as a student in the United States in the 1910s and 1920s had launched him on an intellectual journey which eventually led to the formulation of racial democracy. The experiences of Brazilians who came to study in the United States fifty years later, and particularly of those who ended up studying race, led in an almost diametrically opposed direction. State-enforced racial segregation had now been declared illegal, and the United States had embarked on a bold experiment to overcome segregation's legacy through policies of equal opportunity and affirmative action. Racially-based civil rights and black power movements were at the height of their influence in national life. And within the academy, theories and methods in the study of race were also changing. The rise of social history and 'bottom-up' perspectives on the past, and the use of new quantitative techniques, were redefining the study of slavery and race relations; similar changes were taking place in sociology, where quantitative and macro-structural approaches to the study of racial inequality were pushing aside earlier emphases on black social and cultural deviance.
The result of Brazilian students' exposure to these changes was a new wave of scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s that was even more critical of the Brazilian racial situation than the UNESCO studies had been. The Sao Paulo researchers of the 1950s had seen racial inequality and discrimination as an archaic survival from the period of slavery, which would gradually fade away as capitalist development and modernization opened up increasing opportunities for black upward mobility. But the US-educated scholars of the 1970s -most notably Carlos Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle Silva -saw little evidence of such opening, despite the dramatic economic growth both of the 1950s and of the 'miracle' years of 1968-74. Rather, they showed through careful statistical analyses, based on national censuses and household surveys, that blacks and mulattoes were clearly disadvantaged in relation to whites; and even in cases in which AfroBrazilians brought competitive levels of education and work experience to the job market, they lagged far behind similarly prepared whites in terms of earnings and job advancement. The more education black job-seekers received, in fact, the further behind their white competitors they fell, both in absolute and relative terms.37
The economic growth of the postwar period had indeed expanded opportunities for upward mobility in Brazil but had distributed those opportunities disproportionately to whites. This occurred despite substantial increases in the number of nonwhites prepared to compete for those places. The same boom in higher education which had expanded the size of university faculties had also increased the number of Afro-Brazilian high school and college graduates. In 1950 only 48,000 Afro-Brazilians (out of a total black and brown population of 16.5 million) had graduated from high school, and only 4,000 from college. By 1987 those numbers had grown to 2.7 million and 485,000 respectively, out of a total non-white population of 59.3 million.38 This was a level of educational achievement considerably lower than that of the white population; but it still produced a significant absolute number of non-white competitors for white-collar positions as office workers, executives, professionals, and technicians. As statistical studies and anecdotal evidence both indicated, however, when blacks and mulattoes sought to obtain those positions they encountered major obstacles of prejudice and discrimination.39
As they pondered how to respond to these obstacles, educated Afro-Brazilians found their attention being drawn to foreign models. One was the national liberation movements of Portuguese Africa, mainly Marxist in orientation, which by the mid1970s had won their nations' independence from Brazil's former metropolis. The other models were the civil rights and black power movements of the United States. As early as the 1920s and 1930s, during some of the darkest periods of racial oppression in the United States, Afro-Brazilian observers had noted a paradoxical positive effect of US-style segregation: the way it fostered black institutions and organizations and a sense of racial identity and community. As O Clarim da Alvorada observed in 1928:
Prejudice is a fact in the United States, the odious separation of races, and it was that prejudice that made the North American black a proud and haughty man.... He walks erect, facing down his terrible enemies, his own white countrymen. And in this way, the North American black always triumphs.
Another black paper, Progresso, agreed.
It is clear that if the blacks who live in the shadow of the Statue of Liberty had passively awaited a saving hand from some official entity, they would never have liberated themselves from the legal and economic servitude that vexed and oppressed them. It was through collective action ... that the black children of Uncle Sam succeeded in equalling all the other races in the arts, the sciences, and the economy.
Surveying the black colleges, churches, businesses, civic organizations, and other African-American institutions that had no counterpart in Brazil, O Clarim speculated that perhaps 'blatant, open prejudice is a stimulus to black competence and ability'.40
As those African-American organizations struggled against discrimination and inequality, black writers and intellectuals in Brazil took notice, first of those organizations' efforts and then as time went on of their achievements. During the late 1940s the newspaper Alvorada ran articles on E. Philip Randolph, the ending of segregation in the US armed forces, and other advances in the campaign against segregation, noting that prejudice and discrimination seemed to be on the decline in the United States while they were simultaneously increasing in Brazil.41 As segregation was then overturned during the 1950s and 1960s, the Afro-Brazilian press noted the clear improvements in the racial situation there, and ascribed the credit to the black civil rights movement.42 Thus by the 1970s, as upwardly mobile non-whites began to create their own organizations and movements to combat the racial barriers that they confronted, many looked toward the US civil rights and black power movements as possible models for emulation.43
Those models appealed most strongly to members of the AfroBrazilian middle class. Among the black working class, the United States presented another model of collective action, but of a quite different sort. During the 1970s, working-class black youths in Rio, Sao Paulo, and other south-eastern cities began holding large week-end dances based on American soul music, which they attended wearing clothes and hair styles modelled on the 'Afro' styles of the United States. This 'Black Soul' movement (the English words were used), with its importation of cultural and musical styles from abroad, was seen by many Brazilians, both black and white, as an affront to Brazilian national identity and a direct threat to Brazilian traditions of racial harmony and co-existence.44 But as several students of the movement have noted, this was exactly the point: traditional forms of Afro-Brazilian music and dance, such as samba, had been so thoroughly co-opted as expressions of brasilidade (Brazilianness) that young Afro-Brazilians wishing to express an independent, oppositional identity had to reach outside the national cultural lexicon to do so. And when they did, North American (and Caribbean -Bob Marley, Jimmy Cliff, and other reggae stars were also prominently featured at the Black Soul gatherings) racial consciousness seemed made to order. James 
